Nicolas Humphrey 氏の主張を読む 4

But you do not need to understand what I have just said to get the message. Creating something that gives the illusion of having weird and wonderful properties need be no great shakes, certainly much easier than creating something that actually has them, especially when it is possible to restrict the point of view. (If you want a demonstration of how to make an impossible triangle with paper and scissors, there is a lovely one online.5)

 

あくまで著者は、「あり得ない三角形」のやうに、意識も意外に簡単な仕組で説明できると考へる。

 

There is every reason to think the truth will eventually be discovered by scientific investigation. Even so, I would flag a potential difficulty in getting there. If sentition appears phenomenal only when observed from the specific first-person viewpoint, this is bound to create major difficulties for those neuroscientists who hope to find the neural correlate of consciousness (the NCC) by studying the brain from the outside. For the reality will likely be that the NCC seen from outside will strike the observer as nothing special, merely an oddity ― just as would happen if we were to come across the wooden triangle lying on a bench, without realising what it has been designed to do. Figure 4 illustrates the problem, the lack of correspondence between the third-person and first-person points of view.

 

そして、むしろ、外部からの観察では大した意味を持たないとしか見えないものから意識が生まれてゐる、といふ点がNCC発見の障碍になるだらうと考へてゐる。

 

しかし、根本的な困難は別のところにあるかも知れない。極論だと思はれるだらうが、仮に、知覚が脳内に限定された現象ではないとすれば、意識も身体を超えたところにあるかも知れない。意識は自分の身体を拠点とした意識なので、また意識の生成には脳が重要な役割を果たしてゐるので、それが身体の一部である脳によつて生まれると考へるのは自然だが、鏡が無いと自分の姿を見られないやうに、自分を意識するには、自分を超えた外の世界と関はり、外から(たとへば他人視点から)自分を見る力が必要だと思はれる。そのやうな力を、脳内に閉ぢ籠もつてゐて、意識は持つことができるだらうか。

 

少なくとも、意識が脳内に限定された現象ではないのだとすれば、脳内に意識と関係の深い部分を見つけることは出来るとしても、それだけで全てが説明できるやうなNCCを見出すのは、そもそも不可能事なのかも知れない。

 

The final challenge is going to be to explain the biological purpose of all this. We can surely assume that the kind of development I have sketched above will not have happened accidentally. It must be the result of natural selection favouring genes that underwrite the specialised neural circuits ― whatever they turn out to be ― that do indeed sustain the illusion of qualia, giving rise to the magical mystery show for the first-person. And it is axiomatic that this will only have happened if those lucky enough to be spectators of this show have somehow been at an advantage in terms of biological survival. Yet, how can this be, if, as is widely assumed by theorists, the phenomenal richness of consciousness is of no practical value whatsoever? Fodor has stated this aspect of the problem bluntly: “There are several reasons why consciousness is so baffling. For one thing, it seems to be among the chronically unemployed. What mental processes can be performed only because the mind is conscious, and what does consciousness contribute to their performance? . . As far as anybody knows, anything that our conscious minds can do they could do just as well if they were not conscious. Why then did God bother to make consciousness?”7)

 

 

"as is widely assumed by theorists, the phenomenal richness of consciousness is of no practical value whatsoever"といふ部分は、理解が難しい部分だつた。理論家達は現象的な豊かさが無用だと考へてゐるのだらうか。しかし、意識的な知覚は、現象的な豊かさといふ形で与へられてゐるのではないか。だとすれば、現象的な豊かさが無用といふのは、意識的知覚が無用と同義語になつて仕舞ふ。この点は、少し調べてみても全く理解ができなかつた部分である。過去を反省し、将来の計画を立て、さうした基礎の元に何をすべきか判断する、かうした人間らしい働きは、全てが意識を前提としたものではないだらうか。

 

何か基本的な勘違ひをしてゐるのではないかと心配になる。どなたかこの点についてご教授いただけると有り難い。 (続く)