Accordingly, we should not be tempted to find anything physically irreducible or ontologically special about such inarticulable features. They need reflect nothing more than the current and perhaps changeable limits of the person's capacity for epistemic and semantic articulation, the current limits, that is, of the person's knowledge of the world's fine structure and his own epistemic access to it. Most importantly, there is no reason to expect that the current limits of the typical person's knowledge must mark the boundary of a distinct ontological domain. This is just as true, note, for the epistemic modalities that underwrite (what we loosely call) "introspection" as it is for the epistemic modalities of vision, taste, and audition.
And yet, philosopers have regularly been tempted here, some beyond redemption. Bishop Berkeley rejected the identification of sound with atmospheric compression waves; William Blake and Johann Wolfgang Goethe rejected the identification of light with Isaac Newton's ballistic particles; and Nagel, Jackson, Searle, and Chalmers reject the proposed reduction of inner qualia to physical states of the brain.
